Abstract
INTRODUCTION

I
s it possible to coordinate a federal value-added tax (VAT) with state retail sales taxes (RSTs)? Canada's experience over the last 15 years demonstrates that it is. Must sub-national governments harmonize retail sales taxes if the federal government adopts a VAT? Canadian experience shows that sales tax harmonization need not happen and little coordination might arise. Would states welcome a federal VAT? Probably not since a government would not welcome competition for a scarce revenue base.
No challenge comes without an opportunity. Canada's experience suggests that the adoption of a sensible federal sales tax may provide a more promising avenue than the very limited Streamlined Sales Tax Project to get beyond what McLure (2002) has memorably characterized as the present "nutty" world of state sales taxes.
1 Of course, the less "coordination" there is between states or between states and any federal tax, the higher are the administrative costs for governments and the compliance costs for businesses. But nothing is free. State and federal legislatures may choose to incur such costs in order to retain some desired degree of fi scal autonomy. Indeed, state autonomy may provide an important external benefi t in the form of innovations by independent decision-makers to improve the effi ciency of sales taxes. In Canada, for example, there is room for a fi scally autonomous province (such as Quebec currently and perhaps Ontario in the near future) to improve upon the federal Goods and Services tax (GST), which is by no means a perfect VAT. One example (see Appendix) might be Quebec's different treatment of fi nancial services.
Today, VAT is a key source of revenue in at least 140 countries around the world. Indeed, the US is the last major holdout in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): every other OECD country now has a national VAT. Few countries around the world, however, have VATs at both central and sub-national levels. Nevertheless, in recent years most large, federal countries around the world with the exception of the US have begun to experiment with different combinations of federal and subnational sales taxation. In the next section, we outline briefl y this international experience. Since that discussion makes it clear that the most relevant experience for the US case is that of Canada, we go on in the following section to describe the Canadian system in more detail. In the concluding section, we suggest some lessons for the US from experience in Canada and the rest of the world. Table 1 summarizes recent international experience with taxing sales at more than one jurisdictional level. Excluding Canada, as Bird and Gendron (2001) note, the outstanding case in many ways is Brazil, where for 40 years a two-level sales tax system has existed with both federal and state governments having (different) VATs. The federal VAT is limited essentially to the manufacturing sector and less-than-ideally operated with multiple rates and many exemptions. The state VATs are origin-based and imposed most commonly at a rate of 20.5 percent on "internal" transactions and 12 percent on interstate transactions (seven percent on goods sent to less developed regions).
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH SUB-NATIONAL CONSUMPTION TAXES
2 This system has long been severely criticized in Brazil and many attempts have been made by the federal government to reform it, though as yet with no success.
3 It seems unlikely that there is much the US can learn from Brazilian experience.
Both India and Argentina have also long taxed sales at both federal and subnational levels. Argentina has a relatively well-functioning national VAT, while its provinces impose what are essentially turnover taxes. Although there has been much discussion in Argentina about the need to reform these cascading state taxes, with some favoring provincial VATs (on Canadian lines), and others, RSTs, no agreement has yet been reached on any changes.
A more interesting case is India, where the central government has, over the years, gradually turned its sales tax into what is more or less a VAT, although, as in Brazil, it is essentially limited to the 2 States can establish their own internal rates under the state VAT-the ICMS (imposto sobre operacoes relatives a circulacao de mercadorias e servicios). Different categories of goods (e.g., capital goods, food) are taxed at different rates in different states, with rates ranging from one percent up to 250 percent. The federal VAT-the IPI (imposto sobre productos industrializados)-is also imposed at different rates (ranging up to 350 percent) on different activities, as is a municipal cascading (that is, with no credit offsets for input taxes) sales tax levied on services not included in the ICMS-the ISS (imposto sobre servicios).
3
Federal proposals have generally attempted to move closer to something like the German "shared" VAT or at least the Canadian HST (both of these are discussed later), and have unsurprisingly been rejected as infringing on state autonomy. State attention has been focused more on devising methods to move towards a destination-based VAT, but it has proved to be as diffi cult to move in this direction in Brazil as it seems to be in India (see Table 1 ). GST refers to the federal goods and services tax, and QST, to the Quebec sales tax. As discussed later, these are both VATs.
2
HST refers to the "harmonized sales tax," which is, as discussed later, a joint federal-provincial VAT.
3
Brazil and India have federal taxes that are VATs in that they provide some credit for input taxes but essentially apply only to imports and manufactured goods.
4
Canada's general equalization system does provide for federal transfers to compensate provinces with lower than average tax bases.
5
As we note later, fi ve provinces in Canada still have RSTs.
6 Twenty-one states in India now have VATs, but these taxes are currently operating in effect as origin-based taxes (as in Brazil) rather than destination-based taxes. Germany and Austria have so-called "shared" federal-state VATs, which in practice are really federal taxes with a share of the revenue being transferred on a formula basis to the states. 5 In other developed federal countries (Switzerland, Spain, and Belgium), VAT is entirely a federal tax, and states do not impose general sales taxes.
The main lesson of this brief overview is simply that there are indeed real-world functioning examples of a wide range of possible ways of levying sales taxes at both national and sub-national levels. Some of these taxes, at both levels, are obviously better than others. Only Canada, however, had sub-national RSTs in place at the time it introduced a federal VAT. Moreover, only Canada has succeeded in introducing destination-based sub-national VATs-as well as retaining some provincial RSTs. The Canadian experience, thus, seems well worth a closer look.
CANADA'S SALES TAX EXPERIENCE
Canada struggled along for 70 years with a poorly functioning single-stage federal manufacturers' sales tax (MST) that applied to a limited number of businesses. For much of that period, retail sales taxes (RSTs) similar to those found in most US states existed in all provinces with the exception of Alberta, which even today has no sales tax. Provincial RSTs vary but all apply to a wide range of goods and some services, with about a third of the revenues on average coming from tax assessed on business intermediate and capital goods (Kuo, McGirr, and Poddar 1988) . While, as in the US, in practice RSTs are seldom collected on cross-border trades, in recent years most provinces have made agreements with the federal government to collect their RSTs on goods imported from abroad.
Canada's (former) federal sales tax and the remaining provincial RSTs are not "good taxes" by any defi nition. Both the MST and to a lesser extent the RSTs have been criticized as inefficient and inequitable.
6 These taxes result in uneven effective tax rates on goods and services with the cascading of taxes as products move through the production chain. The signifi cant taxes on capital goods imposed by both the MST and the RST affect investment through a higher cost of capital. Nonetheless, despite constant criticism from the academic community about bad design and frequent complaints from the business community about bad administration, on the whole it is hard to say that even "bad" sales taxes at both the federal and provincial levels did much harm. Adam Smith reportedly once noted that 4 Twenty-one states (out of 28) have now adopted a VAT. The usual standard rate is 12.5 percent, with reduced rates of one percent and four percent and increased rates ranging from 15 percent to 40 percent.
there is a lot of ruin in a country. Certainly, it seems to take more than a few bad sales taxes to bring a country to its knees.
Nonetheless, by the mid-1980s, Canada's federal government, which was recording increasing fi scal defi cits, found that its sales tax base was beginning to erode, essentially because tax planners had belatedly discovered this lucrative frontier. The defi nition of "manufacturing" in the 1923 MST law had been extended over the years on an industry-by-industry basis to encompass more and more of the distributive sector. However, this was largely done administratively rather than by changing the law so these rulings were being increasingly challenged, often successfully. To sustain sales tax revenues, the tax rate was gradually raised from nine percent to ten percent in 1984, 11 percent in January 1986, 12 percent in April 1986, and fi nally, in 1989, to 13.5 percent.
7 In 1987, the federal government proposed substantial reforms in both the sales and income taxes. The sales tax reform was to replace the manufacturers' sales tax by VAT, either in the form of a Business Transfer Tax (which is accounts-based) or a credit-invoice VAT, which is more typical among countries around the world. Income tax reform went ahead, but the Mulroney government, worried about a backlash by voters and from many businesses not subject to the MST, postponed sales tax reform until after the 1988 election. Finally, on January 1, 1991, Canada laid its antique manufacturers' sales tax to rest and followed most countries by introducing a new federal VAT in the standard credit-invoice variant, called the Goods and Services Tax (GST).
8
Federal-provincial issues were important in some areas of design. Under Canada's constitution, federal and provincial governments cannot tax each other, so the federal GST could not be applied to sales to provincial governments. But this rule did not apply to provincial public enterprises (Crown corporations) like the large electricity suppliers, so these companies were both responsible for collecting the tax on their sales and could claim refunds of taxes imposed on their inputs. In principle, the important "MUSH" sector (municipalities, universities, schools and hospitals), as agents of the provinces, was exempt from charging federal GST on sales (unless they sold taxable goods). On the other hand, unlike the provincial governments these institutions were subject to tax on business inputs. However, the federal government decided to provide a partial refund of taxes on inputs purchased by the MUSH sector in order to keep them in the more or less same relative position as they had previously been under the manufacturers' sales tax (which was embodied in the prices of their inputs). Although the refunds varied by type of provincial body, on average they 7 Over this period, the MST rate for building materials rose from fi ve percent to nine percent, and the rate for alcohol and tobacco rose from 12 percent to 19 percent. The MST base was also expanded to include most telecommunication services in 1983 (initially at a rate of six percent, later raised to eight percent). Although MST revenues actually grew faster (10.7 percent per annum) than nominal GDP (8.0 percent per annum) from 1980 to 1990, this was attributable largely to the substantial increases in MST rates. Without these rate increases, MST revenue growth would have been at most 6.3 percent per annum.
As mentioned, the replacement of the MST by the GST was originally proposed as part of a comprehensive reform of the federal income and sales taxes. Unfortunately, in the end income tax reform was introduced three years before the sales tax reform, which was likely one reason why the latter reform proved so unpopular. Other arguments made against the sales tax reform will be familiar to US readers: (1) it would be regressive, (2) it would produce excessive revenues for the federal government, (3) it would be too costly in terms of compliance and administrative costs, and even (4) it was inferior to other possible reforms (e.g., in the existing sales tax or in payroll taxes). We discuss some of these points later. For a fuller summary and survey of these arguments, see Bird (1994). amounted to roughly two-thirds of input taxes paid by the sector.
9
At the same time, one province, Quebec, followed the federal lead and simultaneously replaced its RST by a new provincial VAT, the Quebec Sales Tax (QST). Under the federal-Quebec agreement, Quebec was to collect not only the QST but also the federal GST. Initially, some companies complained that they would be faced with audits by both Quebec and federal authorities, but such complaints are seldom heard today.
The Liberal government elected in 1993 promised to replace the VAT with some other form of tax, which they originally thought could be the Business Transfer Tax initially suggested in 1987.
10 However, the House of Commons Finance committee charged to examine this issue in the end recommended that the federal GST should instead be replaced by a harmonized federal-provincial sales tax. The committee concluded that the Business Transfer Tax would not function well, in part because provincial bodies could not be directly taxed on their value-added accounts as well as the need to mark purchases from non-registered businesses as ineligible as a deduction from the tax base, thereby making the tax appear more like a credit-invoice VAT. In the end, in 1997, following characteristically prolonged and convoluted federal-provincial negotiations, three small Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador) followed Quebec and replaced their RSTs by VATs. The form these provincial VATs took was quite different than in the Quebec case, however: the new provincial VAT was levied on the federal GST base, with the federal government collecting both federal and provincial VATs under the name of the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST). Five other provinces continue to this day with RSTs, while one lucky oil province (Alberta) and the three northern territories continue to have no sales tax at all. Table 2 sets out the present Canadian sales tax system in brief.
Canadian experience so far suggests several conclusions on issues that have been hotly debated in the recent US discussion.
11
Is VAT a "Money Machine"?
Some observers fear that a federal VAT would become a "money machine," fuelling an expansion of government spending over time. Canada's experience with the federal GST is perhaps relevant to the US case.
The GST was introduced in 1991 at a seven percent rate. The tax base for the GST excluded "basic" groceries, drugs and medical devices, and residential rents and new housing were only partially taxed.
12
For 15 years following its introduction, the GST rate remained unchanged and the base was adjusted only in very minor ways. As a result, GST revenues basically tracked nominal GDP and consumer spending over the period. The appropriate treatment of public sector agencies has recently been the subject of several studies in the European Union: see, e.g., Waasenaar and Gradus (2004) . For a fuller discussion, see Gendron (2005) . 10 The business transfer tax is an accounts-based VAT in which companies would remit tax on the difference between sales and purchase of goods and services, including capital goods. For a more complete discussion, see Mintz (1995) . 11 See, e.g., President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) . 12 The replacement of the MST by the GST generated a modest increase in the federal sales tax revenues. These increased revenues were used to fund the refundable sales tax credits for low-and moderate-income households discussed below. 13 From the launch of the GST in 1991 to 2005, GST revenues grew at an annual average rate of 5.1 percent, the same rate of growth as nominal GDP but somewhat above the growth rate of nominal consumption (4.7 percent). Over the most recent fi ve-year period (2001-05), GST revenues grew at annual average rate of 5.1 percent, with nominal consumer spending growing by 5.0 percent annually over the same period. (1) The remaining province, Alberta, and the three northern territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut) have no sales tax.
(2) As discussed later, the base of the Quebec Sales Tax (QST) is slightly different from that of the GST/HST (Goods and Services Tax/Harmonized Sales Tax is the offi cial name of the current federal VAT). The HST applies in the three provinces shown, and the GST, in the rest of the country. Each of the Retail Sales Tax (RST) provinces has its own tax base, generally with considerable taxation of business inputs and with limited coverage of services. The formal name of the RST in most provinces is Provincial Sales Tax (PST).
(3) Although two provinces, Manitoba and British Columbia, permit some (very limited) municipal access to sales taxes, there are essentially no local sales taxes in Canada.
In recent years there have been net reductions in GST revenues. In 1997, the federal government decided to fully, rather than partially, refund input taxes on books purchased by certain institutions (schools, universities and certain charities involved with literacy issues). This precedent led to the Liberal government replacing the partial rebate for municipalities with a complete rebate for taxes on inputs that they have purchased. In 2006, the current Conservative government cut the GST rate to six percent, and remains committed to a further cut to fi ve percent sometime in the future.
As noted above, a major motivation for the introduction of the GST was to prevent the erosion of sales tax revenues that was occurring with the old manufacturers' sales tax. While this objective was clearly achieved, the new tax did not become a "money machine."
Canada's experience with its federal GST may differ from that of other countries, where VAT revenues, and total tax revenues, have on the whole increased relative to GDP.
14 But there may be one important reason that Canada's experience may be more relevant to the US case. Following the precedent set by the provincial RSTs, Canada's GST-unlike other VATs around the world-was from the beginning imposed in a highly visible fashion. For the vast majority of goods and services sold, the GST is added at the cash register, and GST must be explicitly stated on all bills or invoices.
Arguably, the replacement of the "hidden" manufacturers' sales tax by the highly (and frequently) visible GST is the main explanation for the unpopularity of the GST and the failure of VAT revenues to increase (as a ratio of GDP) over time in Canada. Canadians are reminded on a daily basis that the federal government is taxing their purchases. The recent reduction of the GST rate was, thus, a very popular move in political terms. Visibility matters. The revenue effects of a federal VAT in the US may depend to a large extent on whether people have their attention called to its existence every day as in Canada or whether, as in the EU, prices are almost invariably quoted on a tax-inclusive-that is, tax-hidden-basis.
Sales Taxes and Regressivity
A common argument against using a VAT (or other form of sales tax) to reduce reliance on income taxes is that a sales tax would reduce the overall progressivity of the tax system. A sales tax on all consumer goods and services would be somewhat regressive according to conventional measures, since high-income persons save more than persons with moderate or low incomes. When analyzed over the full life cycle of spending, however, the degree of regressivity is mitigated, since today's savings often fi nances tomorrow's consumption. Nevertheless, some degree of regressivity would remain, because bequests are highly skewed towards richer individuals.
The modest degree of regressivity of a general sales tax, such as a comprehensive VAT, can be reduced or eliminated. Zero-rating or exempting certain products-foods and medicines-would make a general VAT less regressive. 15 However, the most effective way to reduce or eliminate the regressivity of the VAT is through the introduction of refundable 14 Keen and Lockwood (2006) have recently examined the "money machine" argument rigorously using crosscountry panel data. While their results are not simple to interpret, they do tend to support the argument that the adoption of a VAT has, in most cases, been associated with an increase in the total tax ratio. 15 VAT terminology is a bit odd. "Exemption" under VAT really means partial taxation because, while sales of exempt goods are free of tax, inputs are not. To be really free of VAT, a transaction must be also be freed from input taxes. When sales are taxed at a rate of zero ("zero-rated"), taxes incurred on inputs are creditable (and, if necessary, refunded), thus freeing the transaction from all VAT on both output and inputs.
income tax credits. Like the US earned income tax credit, such sales tax credits could be claimed by households and individuals who do not pay income taxes. Properly designed, these sales tax credits can eliminate the regressivity that would otherwise be introduced by the VAT, and can, hence, maintain the overall degree of progressivity of the tax system. Canada's GST incorporates both features. Basic groceries, prescription drugs and medical devices are zero-rated, and residential rents are exempt.
16 A refundable income tax credit was also introduced with the GST. A full credit may be claimed by lower-income families and individuals; the credit is gradually "clawed back" as income rises, so that higher income families and individuals receive no credits.
17
Another factor mitigating the regressive effects of sales taxes is the widespread indexing of transfer payments. In Canada, all major federal transfer payments to individuals and families are fully indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Any price-level adjustments associated with the introduction of (or increase in) sales taxes therefore automatically trigger an increase in these transfer payments, provided by both federal and provincial governments. As transfer payments are a highly progressive component of Canada's fi scal system, this provides a further offset to the regressive impact of sales taxes.
The Canadian sales tax system therefore illustrates how the introduction of sales taxes need not reduce the progressivity of the tax-transfer system. Indeed one might argue that the combination of appropriate income tax credits and the full indexation of transfer payments should obviate the need for zero-rating or exempting of specifi c products. However, at the time of the introduction of the GST, some such "base-reducing" progressive features had to be incorporated into the structure of the tax itself in order to make it politically palatable. Whatever the merits of a pure general VAT from an effi ciency standpoint, the bad political optics of taxing basic necessities such as food tend to prevail. With the exception of New Zealand, for example, VAT countries generally do not tax food at the same rate as other goods and services. Either zero-rating or taxation at a much lower rate than the general VAT appears to be the norm (OECD, 2004) .
Transitional Problems
The introduction of a federal sales tax can have a negative but transitory effect on the economy, which may also vary across regions in terms of its impact. This is because the sales tax, by putting upward pressure on prices at given levels of aggregate demand, is akin to an unfavorable supply price shock.
One study (Dungan, Murphy and Wilson, 1994) of the 1990-91 recession in Canada found that the introduction of the GST was a modest explanatory factor (restrictive monetary policies and the US recession being the most important explanatory factors).
Such adverse transitory macroeconomic effects can be mitigated if monetary policy "validates" the fi rst round effects of the sales taxes on the CPI. In order to avoid triggering a price-wage spiral with increased infl ationary expectations, however, the monetary authority must resist any second round effects 16 Sales of existing houses are exempt from GST. Sales of new houses are subject to GST on a sliding scale; modestly priced houses are taxed at a lower rate than higher-priced houses. 17 Canada has long used the income tax system as a transfer mechanism: for example, tax benefi ts for children have been delivered through similar refundable credits since 1978. Similar refundable income tax credits related to sales taxes (and other factors) are also provided by most of the provinces.
through wage increases. If infl ation targeting is in place at the time of introduction of the VAT, it is important to defi ne the infl ation target to be net of sales taxes. This is the case in Canada, where the Bank of Canada's "core" infl ation rate excludes the impact of indirect taxes.
18
If formal infl ation targeting is not used (as is current US Federal Reserve practice), then it is important for the central bank to communicate its objectives-i.e., to announce that the one-off price level effects of introducing a sales tax will not lead to higher interest rates, but that the bank will be vigilant in choking off any additional infl ationary pressures if they occur.
Another largely transitional concern relates to additional administrative and compliance costs associated with the adoption of VAT. This question has been extensively explored in Canada and elsewhere.
19 Studies in the mid-1980s found that compliance costs for the federal MST were 7.6 percent and administrative costs were 0.8 percent of revenue yield, while the similar costs for Ontario's RST were 5.6 percent and 0.6 percent of yield. A subsequent study in 1993 found somewhat lower compliance costs for the GST. All these studies found that compliance costs were signifi cantly regressive with respect to the size of the business. To deal with this problem, Canada (which has a relatively low VAT "threshold"-the level at which fi rms must enter the VAT system) 20 both provided an initial special credit to permit small businesses to acquire any needed new equipment (e.g., cash registers) and allowed most such businesses to fi le GST returns less frequently-often annually, instead of monthly-and to use a simplifi ed accounting system (in effect, instead of allowing input credits, a lower tax rate is applied to sales). Despite substantial initial grumbling, the current system appears now to be both well accepted and functioning at reasonable cost. Administering VAT is in many ways closer to administering a simple gross income tax than a single-stage sales tax, so Canada, of course, incurred some initial organizational and training costs when it launched the GST, as did Quebec when it adopted the QST. The tax administration expanded slightly-for example, an offi ce was opened in Prince Edward Island (in part on regional development grounds), but savings were also associated with the elimination of the Manufacturers' Sales Tax.
Must Provincial Sales Taxes Be Reformed in Wake of a Federal VAT?
Although the hodgepodge that is the present Canadian sales tax system will not appeal to those who like their concepts clear and simple, on the whole it seems to chug along more or less to the satisfaction of most parties concerned. Nor is there any obvious reason why it cannot continue to do so. The present HST could easily be extended to other provinces, if any wished to follow this path-although few of the remaining RST provinces would presumably choose to give the federal government the same degree of control over their tax base. Quebec, as is its custom, has done things very much its own way, not only by administering the federal GST in Quebec, but also by imposing the VAT differently, most importantly with respect to the fi nancial sector (see Appendix).
Initially, Quebec's sales tax regime contained a number of signifi cant differences from the GST-goods and services were taxed at differential rates, some input taxes were not refunded (especially fuel, telecommunications and automobile repair expenses), and exports to other provinces were exempt. Even some administrative practices such as the tax-accounting period differed from the GST. Over time, however, some of the differences from the federal GST disappeared, notably when the QST moved to a uniform rate on goods and services. The present system may not be neat, but Quebec's experience does demonstrate that there is no reason why other provinces, should they decide to adopt an independent VAT (rather than one like the HST that is rigorously linked to the federal tax), cannot do so, with or without any type of prior agreement with the federal government. Moreover, even if some provinces wish to continue penalizing their business sector by imposing misnamed "retail" sales taxes that fall to a large extent on capital goods and business inputs, they can, if they wish, continue down this mistaken path indefi nitely. The house of two-level sales taxation, it seems, can accommodate many varied forms of cohabitation.
LESSONS FOR UNITED STATES FROM CANADA'S EXPERIENCE
The main lesson from Canadian experience for other federal states, such as the United States, is of course simply that it is perfectly possible-not costless, but possible-for both federal and sub-national governments to tax essentially the same base. In particular, Canada has unequivocally demonstrated that a federal VAT can function more or less amiably side by side with disparate state sales taxes, whether VATs or RSTs.
At least four other lessons that might be drawn from Canada's experience of possible relevance to the US case come to mind. First, the best basis for a sub-national VAT is undoubtedly a well-designed and comprehensive national VAT. In this respect, for example, Argentina-although so far it has not followed this path (and Piffano (2005) has recently argued at length that it should not do so)-seems better positioned than either Brazil or India. Both of the latter countries would clearly need to improve their existing central government sales taxes considerably before attempting to reform their sub-national sales tax regimes along Canadian lines. Of course, as others have often argued (e.g., Ebrill, Keen, Bodin and Summers (2001) ), any sales tax system works better if only a single rate is imposed by each taxing jurisdiction.
Second, for a "dual" (two-level) sales tax system to work well, both sub-national and central governments probably need to have an adequate degree of (justified) trust in each other's competence. That the system worked between two such bitter political opponents as the federal government of Canada and the previous (separatist) provincial government of Quebec suggests that the level of trust required may not be all that high (Bird and Gendron, 1998) . While it is perhaps asking too much to expect an equivalent relationship (or quality of administration) to exist soon in such developing countries as India or Argentina, there seems no reason why the US should not be able to do at least as well in this respect as Canada. As Duncan and McLure (2005) show, the US already has a robust tradition of intergovernmental coordination among tax administrators on which to build.
Third, an important lesson for the US from Canadian experience in particular is that a federal VAT should be compatible-within limits that, of course, need to be explored in more detail-with subnational VATs, RSTs, and states or provinces with no sales taxes at all. It would no doubt be nice if federal intrusion into the sales tax area became an occasion for states to look closely at their present sales taxes, to see how "nutty" they often are, and to turn them into more sensible lev-ies. But it is not essential. States that wish to continue taxing business in hidden and undesirable ways may certainly, like some Canadian provinces, continue to do so if they wish.
21 "Fiscal sovereignty"-an essential characteristic of a "truly federal" system-does not exist just so that people can do good and sensible things. It exists so that they can do what they want to do, provided that they are willing to bear as fully as possible the fi scal and economic consequences of their own actions. From this perspective, one might argue that a federal government should cooperate only with VAT states that allowed complete input tax credits-which, as the Appendix notes, is not true of Quebec in Canada. Presumably, a similar rule might even be applied with respect to those states that keep RSTs: that is, they too should perhaps receive federal assistance-for instance, with respect to collecting state taxes on goods imported from abroad-only if they too managed to come close to the same goal.
22 One might, for instance, conceive of accomplishing this by extending to all inputs some variant of the rather VAT-like "advance payment" system that exists in Louisiana.
23
A fi nal (and possibly unpalatable) message that comes from north of the border may be worth mentioning. Co-occupation of both income and sales tax fi elds by both levels of government has been an unavoidable fact of fi scal and political life in Canada for many years. Unfortunately, when everybody can and does tax anything, one casualty has often proved to be political accountability, since it becomes all too easy for each level of government to blame its own failures on "unwarranted encroachments" on its fi scal base by the other level. Federal-provincial squabbling along these lines in Canada is both endless and ultimately pointless.
24 Perhaps this is an essential component of political life in a country with more than one level of "sovereign" government, but to keep the eye on the relevant ball-putting in place adequate accountability at both levels of government, for example-it is important in undertaking major federal policy changes to be very aware of the extent to which states may, or can, act to offset or reinforce such federal decisions as, for example, introducing a VAT.
In the end, however, although Canadian and other international experience may provide some relevant experience on taxing sales at two levels of government, no country seems to have much experience relevant to the US when it comes to one important aspect of the potential sales 21 For example, Bird and Wilson (2004) estimate that Ontario's RST imposes as large a competitive disadvantage on its industry as any aspect of its fi scal system-a message that the provincial government, which is unwilling either to reduce revenues or to tax consumers more openly, has not so far wanted to hear. State governments may prove equally unresponsive. 22 As we noted early, the federal government now cooperates in this way with most RST provinces in Canada, though (as with Quebec's VAT) it does not impose any "quality standard" as a condition. 23 In Louisiana, "wholesalers"-a term that includes manufacturers and other suppliers selling to retailers-are required to collect "advance sales taxes" from such purchasers. Retailers who make such advance payments are in turn allowed to deduct such payments from the taxes due on their own sales provided they support such deductions with invoices from wholesalers that show the advance payment. This is essentially how an invoice-credit VAT works. 24 Whether such confl icts are exacerbated by Canada's "equalization" system, as some argue, or to some extent alleviated by that system, as others suggest, is far from clear, and was one important question recently examined by yet another of Canada's interminable navel-gazing fi scal committees focusing on federal-provincial fi scal relations. For one take on this issue related to the GST, see Smart and Bird (2006 Nonetheless, Canadian and other international experience does not suggest any reason why the introduction of a federal VAT in the US would create any great technical problems for either the states or business. Some states might choose to have their own VAT and, provided it had essentially the same base as the federal VAT, might even agree to have it administered federally (although that would be a much bigger change in the US than it was in Canada, where the federal government has long administered many provincial income taxes). Some-for example, those with local sales taxes-might keep an RST, but seize the occasion to broaden the base to services and "un-tax" business inputs. If they went far enough along these lines, perhaps some such states might also make various administrative cooperation arrangements with the federal government, if both parties so chose. And some, perhaps the great majority, could, and likely would, keep on their merry way with bad taxes badly administered. Life would, of course, be much neater and more conceptually satisfying if everyone did the right thing. But even if they do not, the world will not end. At least it has not done so yet, north of the border. In short, Canadian experience suggests that both the federal and the state governments can to a considerable extent do whatever they want to do with respect to introducing a VAT. 
